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A TROUBLESOME MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT:
LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND SOCIAL ISSUES SURROUNDING
MANDATORY AZT TREATMENT OF HIV POsrIvE
PREGNANT WOMEN
Jennifer Brown, J.D.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The notion of an innocent child bom with a fatal disease
evokes great sympathy. Particularly with a devastating disease
such as pediatric AIDS, there is a moral impetus for society to
attempt to reduce the likelihood of perinatal HIV transmission, not
only to protect the unborn child, but to protect the populace at large
from the further spread of AIDS. Fairly recently, a breakthrough in
the medical community demonstrated that the perinatal
administration of the antiviral drug zidovudine (ZDV) (more
commonly known by its brand name, AZT) to HIV-positive
pregnant women can substantially reduce the likelihood of
perinatal transmission. In response, some members of the medical
community, as well as state and federal officials have endorsed
mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women on the premise that
women with positive test results would be able to make informed
choices about their pregnancies. Certainly it is conceivable that the
next rational step to help eradicate pediatric AIDS could be
mandatory AZT treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women.
However, despite good intentions, the mandatory treatment of
pregnant women raises a number of ethical, medical, and legal
dilemmas.
This paper will explore the complex issues surrounding the
mandatory treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women and will
*
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and environmental health issues. She has a master's degree in Public Affairs and
Policy and experience working in non-profit organizations on issues affecting
disadvantaged populations.

68

BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

VOL. XVIII

discuss the myriad of ethical, legal, and public health issues
embodied in this subject matter. It will attempt to resolve the
conflict that exists between the state's benevolent interest in the
health of the fetus and society at large, and the constitutional rights
of the mother. Ultimately, this paper concludes that mandatory
AZT treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women would be too
great an infiingement on the constitutional rights of the mother. If
such infringements are allowed in this context, it is likely that there
will be a greater trampling on women's liberty interests with future
public health concerns. As a result, the moral impetus to foster the
health of children and society must be distinguished from the legal
right to intervene in a pregnant woman's medical decision making.
Overall, pregnant women must be treated the same as other
members of society and be afforded the same right to refuse
medical treatment.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Brief Overview of the Problem

The fastest growing group of Americans with reported HIV
infection is women in their childbearing years.1 At the end of
1996, there were 581,429 individuals diagnosed with AIDS in the
United States, with women accounting for 15% of this total and for
20% of the new cases diagnosed in 1996.2 Although researchers
originally believed that pregnancy was a factor in HIV
progression,3 more recent studies have indicated that pregnancy has
no adverse effects on the progression of HIV.4 Instead, poor
maternal and infant outcomes are related to such factors as drug
use, lack of prenatal care, and an advanced HIV-disease state.5 Not
1 Laura Hoyt, M.D., HIVInfection in Women andChildren: SpecialConcerns
in PreventionandCare, POSTGRADUATE MED., Oct. 1997, at 165.
2 See id.
3
See Len Scarpinato, Editorial, Pregnancy in Women With Known HIV
Infection: What Do We and Don't We Know?, 157 ARCH. INTER. MED. 2543

(1997).
4
5

See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 165.
See id at 166.
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surprisingly, among HIV-positive mothers, there is a high risk of
fetal loss,6 and advanced maternal HIV disease can have adverse
effects on the infant, regardless of whether the infant becomes
infected with the disease. 7 However, despite this risk, one study
pregnant
conducted in Italy indicated that 65% of 331 HIV-infected
8
term.
to
pregnancy
their
carry
to
decided
women
1.

Perinatal Transmission

A mother can transmit HIV to her infant in a number of9
ways and a number of factors increase the risk of transmission.
Essentially, maternal antibodies to HIV cross the placenta barrier
during pregnancy. 10 The result is that all babies born to HIVinfected mothers will test positive to the disease at birth and
several months thereafter." However, a positive test does not
indicate that the infant has the disease, since only one-in-four
children born to HIV-positive women will be infected.' 2 Some
studies suggest that perinatal transmission of IV usually occurs
during labor and delivery, when the infant is exposed to membrane
ruptures and maternal blood. 13 In addition, factors such as
advanced IV-disease, drug use during pregnancy, and maternal
vitamin A deficiency have all been found to contribute to the
Finally, breast-feeding
mother-child transmission of HIV. 14
increases the risk of transmission of HIV from mother to infants by
about 10% to 19%."
6 See Scarpinato, supra note 3, at 2543.
7 See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 166.
8 See Scarpinato, supra note 3, at 2543.

9

10

See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 166, 169.
Lawrence D. Frenkel, M.D. & Sunanda Gaur, M.D., Perinatal HIV

Infection andAIDS, 21 CLINICS INPERINATOLOGY 95, 97 (1994).
1 See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 171.
12
See Edward M. Connor, M.D., et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with Zidovudine
Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1176 (1994).
13 See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 169.
14 See id.
15

See id.
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Protocol 076

Currently, HIV disease is among the leading causes of
death among children in the United States, 16 and perinatal
transmission of HIV accounts for almost all new HIV infections in
children.' 7 However, in February 1994, the National Institutes of
Health announced a medical breakthrough: the AIDS Clinical
Trials Group Protocol 076 demonstrated that AZT administered to
a group of HIV-infected women during pregnancy and labor and to
their newborns reduced the risk for perinatal IV transmission by
two-thirds, from about 25% to 8%.18 The findings of this study
had a major impact on perinatal transmission of HIV in the United
States 19 and prompted the Public Health Service to recommend
that health care providers counsel pregnant women regarding the
benefits of voluntary HIV testing 2° and the use of antiretroviral
drugs during pregnancy. 2 1 As a result, an increased use of AZT by
HIV-infected pregnant women resulted in a substantial reduction in
the number of perinatally acquired AIDS cases.22 For example,
from 1984 through 1992, the estimated number of children with
perinatally acquired AIDS diagnosed each year increased, then
declined 43% during 1992 - 1996.23 However, despite these
positive statistics, it must be kept in mind that the results of
Protocol 076 did not prove that AZT could prevent a young child

16

R.J. Simonds, M.D. & Martha Rogers, M.D., Editorial, Preventing

PerinatalHIVlnfection: How FarHave We Come?, 275 JAMA 1514 (1996).
17
See Amer. Med. Assoc., Update: PerinatallyAcquired HIVAIDS-United
States, 1997, 134 ARCH. DERMATOL. 257 (1998).
18 See Connor, supranote 12, at 1176; Hoyt, supra note 1, at 166; Simonds &
Rogers, supra note 16, at 1514.
19 See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 166.
20

See id.

21

See Lynne Mofenson, M.D., U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Services, Public

Health Service Task Force Recommendations For the Use of Antiretroviral
Drugs in Pregnant Women Infected With HIV-1 for Maternal Health and For
Reducing PerinatalHIV-1 Transmission in the United States, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 30, 1998, at 1.

22

See Amer. Med. Assoc., supranote 17, at 257.

2

See id.
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from being infected with HIV. 24 The study demonstrated that AZT
treatment could reduce the risk of perinatal transmission from
about 25% to 8%.25 Thus, any assertion that a particular infant's
infection with HIV could be prevented is speculative at best.
3.

AZT Treatment and Maternal-Fetal Health

Generally, HIV-positive pregnant women begin taking AZT
after their first trimester and continue to take it throughout the
pregnancy and intravenously during labor.26 The infant then
receives AZT syrup for six weeks after birth.27 Although further
studies have confirmed the efficacy of AZT for reduction of
perinatal transmission and have extended this efficacy to children
of women with advanced disease, 28 there are a number of
important medical considerations surrounding the use of
antiretroviral drugs in pregnancy. 29 The original study (Protocol
076) indicated that the short-term effects of exposure to AZT
caused reversible anemia in infants. 30 However, it is largely
unknown what the long-term effects of exposure to AZT will be on
both newborns and their mothers. 3 1 While it has not been shown
that AZT use during pregnancy causes premature birth, fetal
distress, or birth defects, few long-term studies have been
conducted on its potential side effects. 32 Furthermore, there are
ZDV therapy reduced the infection rate from 25.5% to 8.3%. See Connor,
supranote 12, at 1176.
25 See Hoyt, supra note 1,at 166.
26
Newborn AIDS Cases Decline 43 Percent: Health Officials Say AZT
24

Treatments Reduce Mother-Infant Infection Rate, AuSTIN
Nov. 21, 1997, at A18.
27
28

AMER.-STATESMAN,

See id.

See Paris R. Baldacci, An Introduction to "MandatoryHIV Screening of

Newborns: A Child's Welfare in Conflict with its Mother's Constitutional
Rights? "-False Dichotomies Make Bad Law, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2

(1996).
29
See Mofenson, supra note 21, at 3-9.
30
See Hoyt, supranote 1,at 169-70.
31
See Mofenson, supra note 21, at 1.
32
See Samantha Catherine Halem, Note, At What Cost?: An Argument
Against Mandatory AZT Treatment of HIV-Positive PregnantWomen, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 495 (1997).
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known short-term effects to taking AZT, which include bone
33
marrow suppression, malaise, nausea, headaches, and seizures.
In addition, the potential long-term effects of AZT may include
cancer, toxicity, and adverse effects on certain tissues and the
reproductive system.34
Moreover, the use of AZT during
pregnancy could be associated with the development of AZTresistance, which could reduce the drug's therapeutic benefit for
the mother.
Additionally, it is possible that the use of AZT
during one pregnancy will adversely affect the efficacy of the drug
for any subsequent pregnancies. 36 Finally, since only women with
mildly or moderately symptomatic HIV disease with no history of
antiretroviral therapy were enrolled in Protocol 076 (women who
had previously undergone antiviral drug treatment were excluded
from this study), some women, such as those with depressed
immune systems, may not benefit from AZT treatment at all.37
Overall, the question of how or whether women should take
antiretroviral drugs during pregnancy has been difficult to address
because of a lack of safety and efficacy data. 38 Thus, health care
providers should proceed with caution when recommending AZT
therapy for HIV-positive pregnant women.
B.

Mandatory IIV Testing

The success of Protocol 076 has prompted some members
of the medical profession, as well as state, local, and federal
33

34

See id.at 494.

See Lynne Mofenson, M.D. & James Balsley, M.D., U.S. Dep't of Health &

Hum. Services, Recommendations of the U.S. Public Health Service Task Force
on the Use of Zidovudine to Reduce Perinatal Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REP., Aug. 5, 1994, at 1, 5.
3- See id.at 6.
36 See Theresa M. Mcgovern, Mandatory HIV Testing and Treating of ChildBearing Women: AnUnnatural, Illegal, and Unsound Approach, 28 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469,477 (1997).
37 See David Lowe, Recent Development, HIV Study Raises EthicalConcerns
for the Treatment of Pregnant Women, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 176, 178

(1995).

38

See Hoyt, supranote 1, at 169.
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legislators to recommend the mandatory EIV testing of all
pregnant women. 39 There are many supporters of this proposal,
particularly because the majority of people in the United States
who are infected with 1IV are unaware of their status, and because
it is possible for an HIV-positive woman to conceive and bear a
child without becoming aware of her own status or that of her
child.40 As one commentator noted, "Indeed, it is indisputable that
pregnant women who do not know that they are Iv-positive are
unlikely to seek ZDV treatment to prevent transmission to their
infants. The issue has thus been presented: Is requiring women to
take a simple blood test a greater evil than increasing the risk that
an infant will be born HIV-positive? ' 41 The difficulty in arriving
at a simple answer to this question demonstrates the numerous and
troubling legal, ethical, and moral issues that are embodied in the
controversy over whether to mandate HIV testing of pregnant
women.
1.

Federal Mandatory Testing Initiatives

In 1996, Congress addressed the issue of mandatory IIV
testing of newborns and pregnant women by amending the
Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act, also known as
the Ryan White CARE Act.42 Essentially, the Ryan White CARE
Act was enacted to provide emergency funding for cities that are
disproportionately affected by the AIDS epidemic to ensure greater
access to health care for poor persons infected with the HIV
virus. 43 The goals of the 1996 amendments are to reduce the
number of HIV-infected infants by requiring all states to conform
to the amended Act or risk losing available federal financing. 44
39
40

See Halem, supra note 32, at 491.
See Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Development, Compelled Antiviral

Treatment of HIV Positive Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN's L. J. 473, 475
(1995).
41 Lowe, supranote 37, at 177.
42
Ryan White CARE Act, Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-146, § 7,
110 Stat. 1346 (1996).
43
See Jennifer Sinton, Rights Disclosure and Mandatory HIV Testing of
PregnantWomen and Newborns, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 187, 195, 196 (1997).
44 See id. at 196-97.
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The 1996 amendments specifically required that states adopt the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Public Health Service
guidelines recommending HIV counseling and voluntary testing of
all pregnant women by September 1996. 4 5 However, a heavy
burden is placed on states to prove that women are consenting to
testing or that there has been a substantial reduction in the rate of
HIV-positive newborns. The amendments provide that if the
Health and Human Services Secretary determines that mandatory
testing has not become routine practice, each state will have
eighteen months to demonstrate one of the following or lose its
Ryan White CARE Act funds: (1) a 50% reduction in the rate of
new AIDS cases resulting from perinatal transmission; (2) HIV
testing of at least 95% of the women who have received at least
two prenatal visits prior to thirty-four weeks gestation; (3) a
program of mandatory testing of all newborns whose mothers have
not undergone prenatal IV testing.46 As one author described the
1996 amendments, "[C]ongress has in effect invited states to
impose mandatory testing measures or lose all their Ryan White
47
funding.
2.

State Mandatory Testing Initiatives

State legislatures have also considered legislation that
would mandate HIV testing of all pregnant women. 48 For example,
Delaware and Tennessee require prenatal testing for HIV, and
Arkansas, Florida, and Missouri allow mandatory testing for
pregnant women in most cases.4 9
Rhode Island strongly
encourages neonatal IV testing, and New York requires the state
50
to test all newborns for IV and inform the mother of the results.
The medical rationale for mandatory testing is that pregnant
women with positive test results would be able to make informed
choices about their pregnancy by being able to choose AZT
45
46
47
48

49
50

See id. at 195-96.
See § 7, Stat. at 1370-71.
See Mcgovern, supra note 36, at 471.
See Halem, supra note 32, at 495.
See id at 495-96.
See id. at 496.
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treatment or abortion, and that mothers of newborns could refrain
from breast feeding.51
3.

The Debate Surrounding Mandatory
Treatment of HIV+ Pregnant Women

Testing/

The public debate surrounding mandatory HIV testing of
pregnant women has been characterized as a conflict between fetal
rights and women's rights, and as a conflict between protecting the
public health on the one hand, and the civil liberties and privacy
rights of women on the other.52 One author characterized this
debate quite well:
[W]hile opponents of mandatory testing have
argued that mandatory testing is bad public health
policy that harms women and children, proponents
have ignored these assertions and drawn attention to
opponents' legal arguments, that mandatory testing
violates women's privacy rights, autonomy and
freedom of choice. Proponents of mandatory testing
argue that civil libertarians and feminists who seek
to preserve women's rights have failed to consider
the public health consequences of allowing women
to seek testing voluntarily. For proponents, the
health of an infant and the general public is
paramount and infants, as 'innocents,' have rights
that are more important than the privacy rights of
women. Proponents argue that a woman has a 'right
to know' that she is infected with HIV, as opposed
to the idea that a woman has the right to decide for
herself. Further, proponents believe that protecting
a woman's 'right not to know' her HIV status is a
'perversion of human rights' that injures both
women and the general public health.53
51
52

53

See id. at 496.
See Sinton, supra note 43, at 188.
Id. 188-89 (footnotes omitted).
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Another justification for mandatory HIV testing of pregnant
women is that since it is already performed on blood donors,
military and Foreign Service personnel, federal prisoners, federal
job corps applicants, and immigrants, it should be lawful to test
pregnant women as well. 4 Finally, mandatory HIV testing of
pregnant women has been likened to mandatory screening for
55
syphilis, which is still required by forty-five states.
Despite the arguments advanced for the mandatory HIV
testing of pregnant women, the CDC intentionally rejected such
coercive measures because it might encourage women to avoid
prenatal care.5 6 In addition, organizations of experts such as the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the
American Academy of Pediatrics have opposed proposals for
mandatory HIV testing regimes for pregnant women because they
are potentially harmful to women and their relationship with their
health care providers.5 7
These experts agree that routine
counseling and voluntary testing during prenatal care has proven to
be the most effective way of identifying HIV-infected women and
engaging them in care. 58 This position is also reflective of the
approach taken in the first decade of the AIDS epidemic by public
health officials who, out of a concern that discrimination against
infected individuals was widespread, felt that it would be unjust to
forcibly compel testing; the consensus was that people at risk of
HIV infection are more likely to seek health care when testing is
consensual and anonymity or confidentiality is assured. 9
Moreover, it would be particularly damaging to discourage
pregnant women from seeking medical care with coercive
measures since HIV infection may be most prevalent in those
women who already lack access to medical care. 60 Since coercive
testing creates an environment of distrust and fails to encourage a

54
55

See Halem, supra note 32, at 496.
See id. at 496-97.

5
59

See Sinton, supranote 43, at 195-96.
See Mcgovern, supranote 36, at 473-74.
See id. at 474.
See Sinton, supranote 43, at 191-92.

'

See id. at 201-02.

56
57
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61
cooperative relationship between medical providers and patients,
opponents of mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women argue that
it will actually harm women and their children. Moreover,
mandatory HIV testing could cause women to become generally
mistrustful of medical care since improper disclosure could result
in family violence, or discrimination in health care, insurance,
employment, and housing. 62 Finally, many commentators agree
that mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women or newborns
significantly infringes on a woman's constitutionally protected
rights by abridging privacy rights, violating equal protection, and
opening the door to future trampling on reproductive autonomy for
63
women.

4.

Is the Next Logical Step Mandated Treatment of
HIV-positive Pregnant Women?

As one commentator noted, "If women are forced to be
tested for HIV as a means of protecting their infants, it is a short
and slippery slope to the conclusion that women should be forced
to undergo treatment toward the same end."64 As the movement
for mandatory HIV testing of pregnant women gains momentum,
certainly it is conceivable that the next step could be a movement
toward mandatory AZT treatment of HIV-positive pregnant
women.65 "[M]andatory testing provides a means for the
government to initiate a coercive approach requiring pregnant
women who test positive to begin AZT therapy. 6 6 However, as
the next section of this paper will illustrate, such an approach
raises a host of serious ethical, legal, and social issues, which
typify the maternal-fetal conflict at issue.
61

See id. at 206.

62
63

See Mcgovern, supranote 36, at 475.
See generally Grizzi, supra note 40; Halem, supra note 32; Lowe, supra

note 37; Mcgovern, supra note 36; Linda Farber Post, Note, Unblinded
Mandatory HIV Screening of Newborns: Care or Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 169 (1994); Sinton, supranote 43.
64 Lowe, supranote 37, at 177.
65
"Building upon the movement for mandatory testing, mandatory treatment
seems to be the next logical step." Halem, supranote 32, at 492.
6 Grizzi, supra note 40, at 475.
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III.

BROAD ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL ISSUES

A.

The Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Analytic Framework
1.

Moral & Ethical Principles Surrounding a Mandated
AZT Treatment Regime

The maternal-fetal relationship is a unique and delicate one.
Because the fetus is physically located inside the woman, the
actions of one person are literally and figuratively intertwined with
those of a potential person. Although medical practitioners
normally recommend treatment to benefit both the mother and
fetus, the welfare of the two can be at odds. "Conceptually, the
medical care of each can be approached independently, but
67
practically, neither can be treated without affecting the other."
Because of this unique situation, conflicts arise when the interests
of the woman and the fetus clash. In such situations, there is often
societal impetus to promote the well being of both the mother and
the fetus, or to even choose between them. 68 The issues
surrounding mandatory HIV testing and treatment of pregnant
women exemplify this situation. As one commentator noted with
regard to this issue: "The political dimension to the debate over
mandatory testing, mandatory treatment, or both is the fight over
who gets the power to make medical decisions for pregnant
women." 69 Further, another author pointed out, "[g]iven the trend
in medicine toward treating the fetus as a patient, it is foreseeable
that women infected with HIV who decide to become pregnant will
be more likely than most other pregnant women to be subject to
forced medical interventions on behalf of the fetus." 70 However, as
one author noted, "It is unethical for a physician to substitute his or
her ethical determination for that of the mother where there are
67

Lawrence J. Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of
PregnantWomen; Life Liberty, andLaw in Conflict, 259 JAMA 1060 (1988).
68
69
70

See id
Lowe, supra note 37, at 180.
Tanya Lovell Banks, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the

Reproductive Right of HIV-Infected Women, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 57, 82

(1996).
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potential conflicts between the mother's interests and the infant's
or fetus' interests." 71 This paper argues that when there is
discordance between the interests of the pregnant woman and the
fetus she is carrying, the interests of the mother should almost
always prevail.
2. Mandatory Treatment Regime: What Would it Look
Like?
Governmental efforts to coerce HIV-positive pregnant
women to initiate and continue AZT therapy could take a couple of
different forms. First, a pregnant woman would go to her local
health care provider to receive care, and while there, she would
undergo an IlV test. Her physician might then inform her that she
is HIV-positive and that the law requires her to submit to AZT
treatment in order to prevent the transmission of HIV to her fetus.
Legislation could either directly require women to initiate and
continue therapy as medically indicated, with penalties inflicted
upon women who refused to cooperate, 72 or could require the
physician to direct the woman to initiate therapy, with the
physician facing penalties for a failure to do so.73 Either scenario
could mean that the woman would be monitored up to five times a
day during her pregnancy to ensure that she is taking the drug as
directed.74 Therefore, aside from having the choice of whether to
have the baby, the woman's medical decisions would all be made
by the state, which would essentially "police" pregnant women into
compliance with its medical directives. In this way, the state
would transform an ethical duty.to intervene on behalf of the fetus
into a legal duty by enforcing maternal compliance with a coercive,
legally required treatment regime. However, this interventionist
scenario, which epitomizes the maternal-fetal conflict, is
unconstitutional.
71

72

487.

Lowe, supranote 37, at 181.

This scenario was predicted by Michael A. Grizzi. See supra note 40, at

This scenario was also predicted by Michael A. Grizzi. See supra note 40,
at 487.
74 See Halem, supra note 32, at 499.
73
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Legal/Constitutional Issues
1.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy is grounded in both constitutional
doctrine and popular public discourse. In our society, notions of
self-determination are very important and are reflected in both
legislative and judicial reasoning. 75 Often termed the "right to be
let alone," it is frequently invoked in many contexts involving
personal decision-making. 76 The Supreme Court cases Griswold v.
Connecticut,7 7 Eisenstadt v. Baird,78 and Roe v. Wade"9 solidly
define the sanctity of the individual against an overreaching
government in matters involving procreative choices. Specifically,
in Griswold, the Supreme Court articulated a substantive right to
the privacy of personal decision making by finding a "right to
privacy" in the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Amendments."0 The Court recognized that the right to
privacy as autonomy is violated when the individual
is deprived of
81
action.
and
decision-making
personal
of
the right
This individual right to privacy in matters concerning
personal dignity and autonomy was more recently affirmed by the
Supreme Court in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.82 In Casey, the
Court stated, "These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person can make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
75

For example, in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court

upheld a statute requiring copies of prescriptions for certain drugs and
recognized an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important

decisions." Id. at 599.
76
This concept was first articulated by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a right to marital privacy).
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding the right to privacy per Griswold to
include individual procreative privacy rights).
79
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of personal privacy includes a
woman's right to have an abortion).
80 Griswold,381 U.S. at479 (1965).
77
78

81
82

See id.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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by the Fourteenth Amendment."83 The Court has interpreted these
"matters" to include marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education, where the personal
privacy rights of the individual in making important decisions are
paramount to state interference. 84 Furthermore, any state action
that infringes upon this fundamental right to privacy is subjected to
the most exacting level of scrutiny; namely, the state has to show
that the challenged policy is justified by a compelling state interest
and that the means used to achieve that interest are narrowly
tailored. 5
2.

Informed Consent

Particularly in the health care setting, the right to privacy
underscores the priority given to the values and wishes of the
individual patient. For example, in Whalen v. Roe,8 6 the Supreme
Court recognized a right to informational privacy and a right to
privacy in medical decision-making. 7 Intertwined with this notion
of privacy in health care decision-making is the concept of
informed consent, which reflects the belief that competent adults
are entitled to refuse medical intervention. This doctrine "has
developed out of strong judicial deference toward individual
autonomy, reflecting a belief that an individual has a right to be
free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person, and a
basic moral principle that it is wrong to force another to act against
his or her will.",8 8 Thus, informed consent dictates that all adult
patients have the right to accept or reject medical recommendations
based on their own personal priorities and values.89 In fact, at

"
84

Id. at 851.
See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).

86

See, e.g., id.at 686.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).

87

See id.at 598-99 (1977).

85

88

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS

397 (3d ed. 1997).
89 See Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
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common law, a refusal to recognize this90 right could result in
physician liability for assault on the patient.
3.

Substantive Due Process

"[W]hen considering forced medical treatment of pregnant
women, state courts have typically looked to two types of Supreme
Court substantive due process precedent: cases analyzing the right
to refuse medical treatment, and those examining reproductive
rights." 91 Generally, in order to prevail on a substantive due
process argument, a plaintiff must prove that the state action
infringes on an interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
92
Fourteenth Amendment: a fundamental right or a liberty interest.
If a right is fundamental, the state regulation will be subject to the
most exacting scrutiny: the state will have to produce a compelling
interest for the infringement on the fundamental right and
demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. 93 If a liberty interest is found, the test is not strict--the
type of judicial scrutiny offered is usually the undue burden
94
standard that was advanced in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
This test looks at whether the state's action has created an undue
burden on the individual.95 The state's action will be upheld if it is
reasonably related to an important and legitimate or substantial
96
government interest.
4.

The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

The right to reject medical treatment was first articulated by
the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of
Health,97 where the Court recognized an individual's Fourteenth
90
91
92
93

See id. at 93.
Halem, supra note 32, at 502.
See id.at 503.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

94 See id.
9' See id.
at 877-78.
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98
Amendment liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.
Although the Court in Cruzan did not recognize that the right to
refuse medical treatment is a fundamental right, it clearly set forth
the notion that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected
99
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."
However, this liberty interest is not absolute: the Court in Cruzan
held that the lawfulness of the state action "must be determined by
balancing the [individual's] liberty interests against the relevant
state interests."'100 Thus, because the state has a legitimate interest
in the preservation of human life, 101 it is unclear under what
circumstances a patient's desire to refuse unwanted procedures
10 2
may be outweighed by the interests advanced by the state.
While the Cruzan facts are different from compelled AZT
treatment of pregnant women, Cruzan's holding strongly suggests
that an HIV-positive pregnant woman could refuse AZT therapy.
However, it is also necessary to consider the Cruzan balancing
test, where the legitimacy of the state action must be determined by
balancing the individual's liberty interests against the relevant state
interests. 0 3 The relevant state interests in the protection of the
public health are significant: the state has a legitimate interest in
forced medication which will help save the lives of innocent
children and help eradicate the spread of AIDS. However, a
woman has a powerful interest in preserving her bodily integrity
and controlling her reproductive destiny. Therefore, in balancing
all the relevant interests, one could conclude that if a state is
allowed to justify an invasion of women's rights, it opens the door
for a further invasion of women's rights with future health
concerns. Thus, in this instance, a woman's right to control her
own body far outweighs the state's interest in the public health.

5.

Reproductive Rights Analysis

9

See id.

1oo

Ild. at 262.
Id. at 279 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).

'01

See id. at 280.
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See id. at 279.
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Reproductive rights analysis has frequently been used to
resolve cases involving a pregnant woman's right to refuse various
forms of medical treatment.10 4 Often, the consistent issue in such
10 5
cases is whether the fetus has rights.
Although Roe v. Wade dealt with a woman's right to privacy
in the abortion context, 10 6 state courts have often cited dicta in the
case to justify an intrusion on pregnant women's medical decision
making. 10 7 To assert support for compulsory medical treatment of
pregnant women, state courts seize upon the language in Roe that
declares that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life at the point of viability. 0 8 However,
while Roe acknowledged the state's compelling ihterest in the fetus
at viability, it placed a limit on the exercise of this interest by
permitting a woman to obtain an abortion even after fetal viability
if "it is necessary to preserve [her] life or health." ' 9 Thus, it is
inaccurate to maintain that Roe grants the state unlimited discretion
in protecting a viable fetus. Moreover, in Doe v. Bolton"l ° and
United States v. Vuitch," the Court upheld statutes that allowed
the physician to consider all attendant circumstances that might be
relevant to the well being of the mother and concluded that the
health of the pregnant woman must be broadly defined."12 In
addition, in Colautti v. Franklin,"3 the Court struck down a
Pennsylvania abortion statute because it failed to clearly specify
that the woman's health must always prevail over the fetus' life
and health when they conflict." 4 Similarly, in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists,1 5 the Court
104 See Nelson & Milliken, supranote
105 See Halem, supra note 32, at 516.
106 Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107 See Halem, supranote 32, at 516.

67, at 1065.

lo See id.
109 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
10
410 U.S. 179 (1973).

"'
112
113

114

402 U.S. 62 (1971).
See id.; Bolton, 410 U.S. 179.
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
See id.

115 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986).
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struck down another Pennsylvania statute because it required a
woman to bear an increased medical risk to save her viable fetus,
thus violating the ruling in Colautti which forbid statutes that
require trade-offs between a woman's health and that of her
fetus. 116 These cases solidly support the notion that when the
health interests of a woman and her fetus conflict, a state is
constitutionally bound to place the woman's interests above the
fetus. Hence, it would be impermissible for a state to force a
pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment for the benefit of
the fetus if that treatment endangers her life or health in any way.
Therefore, in light of some of the serious medical concerns that
AZT treatment may pose to pregnant women, it is likely that
compelled AZT treatment of HIV-positive pregnant women would
not pass constitutional muster. Finally, although the most recent
Supreme Court abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
limited the right to an abortion as established in Roe and advanced
the undue burden standard, it upheld a woman's "ultimate control
over her destiny and her body" 117
All of these reproductive rights cases suggest that although
there is a state interest in a developing fetus, a woman who chooses
to continue her pregnancy and not abort does not give up her right
to control her own body.
6.

Equal Protection

HIV-positive pregnant women could also challenge a
mandatory AZT treatment regime under the Equal Protection
clause, in that the regime constitutes pregnancy or sex
However, the Supreme Court has only
discrimination. u 8
See id.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992).
The Fifth Amendment (covering federal government activity) states that
"No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment (relating to state
involvement) states,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
116

17
118
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recognized that discrimination based on pregnancy is prohibited
under the Equal Protection Clause in the employment context. 119 If
a court found that pregnancy discrimination is per se sex
discrimination, then the appropriate level of scrutiny is the
intermediate level. 120 Under this standard, the policy or statute will
be found constitutional if the state establishes that the regulation
serves an important government objective and the regulation is
substantially related to that end. 12 1 Therefore, a state seeking to
compel a pregnant woman to undergo AZT treatment would have
to show that such treatment would serve the important government
objective of preventing children from being born with HIV and that
AZT therapy is substantially related to this objective. Women
could counter this argument by proving that the state's objective
could be better achieved through less intrusive means, and that the
program of mandatory treatment is not sufficiently tailored to
fulfill the state's goals.
On the other hand, if the court finds that singling out
pregnant women for treatment is not per se sex discrimination, then
the rational basis standard of review would be applied. 122 This
standard of review represents the minimum level of inquiry and
requires only that the regulation have a rational relationship to the
state's purpose. 123 Traditionally, this standard has generally been
an easy obstacle for the state to overcome. 124 However, as UA W v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.12 5 held, employment discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy or the ability to become pregnant is sex
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

119

See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).

120 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
121 See id.
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See Geduldig v. Aiello, 410 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding that excluding

pregnancy-related disabilities from a state-sponsored disability program was not
sex discrimination).
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discrimination. 126 Moreover, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty127 found
that an employer's policy that denied women their accumulated
seniority when returning from pregnancy violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.128 Although this case did not deal
directly with the Equal Protection Clause, its reasoning is quite
persuasive: namely, the Satty court held that an employer who
penalized women because they were pregnant should be held to the
intermediate level of scrutiny. 129 This is quite logical since
penalizing a woman for her pregnancy status certainly amounts to
sex discrimination.
Therefore, applying this reasoning, since a mandatory
treatment regime would penalize pregnant women for being
pregnant by forcing them to bear the risk of the side effects of AZT
and abridging their right to bodily autonomy, the intermediate level
of scrutiny should apply. Subsequently, women could most likely
prove that the state's objective of reducing the risk that children
will be born with HIV could be better achieved through less
intrusive means, and that the program of mandatory treatment is
not sufficiently tailored to fulfill the state's goals.
7.

The State's Role in Protecting the Public Health

Although individual privacy rights are paramount in our
society, the state can interfere with these rights by invoking its
police powers to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 3 '
3
For example, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,1
1 the Supreme Court
upheld a statute mandating vaccination even though it infringed
upon individual rights.' 32 While the Court in Jacobson held that
states may enact quarantine laws to preserve the public health, it

128

See id.
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
See id.
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See id.

130

See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

131
132

See id.
See id.
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also held that the state must not act arbitrarily but must have a "real
133
or substantial relation" to a public health objective.
One of the well-known uses of public health laws related to
the treatment of individuals with tuberculosis. Today, about 40
states have public health laws that require the quarantine of
infected individuals. 134 Thus, in order to safeguard the public
health, the state may require that individuals give up certain liberty
interests. For example, in In re Halko135 the California Court of
Appeals ruled that the confinement of people with tuberculosis to a
136
public hospital did not violate their constitutional rights.
Similarly, in City of N.Y v. New Saint Mark's Bath,137 the court
invoked Jacobson and upheld a restrictive law aimed at stemming
138
HIV transmission by shutting down gay bathhouses.
In light of these cases, states could claim an interest in the
public health by compelling HIV-positive pregnant women to be
treated with AZT in order to decrease the number of infectious
carriers of a recognized fatal disease. However, given the
invasiveness and the potential dangers of AZT treatment to both
mothers and infants, it is unlikely that a mandated AZT treatment
regime could be justified. Moreover, as one commentator noted,
"[c]ourts have allowed public health concerns to trump individual
liberties to an extent equivalent to a program of forced AZT
treatment only when they were confronted with diseases far more
contagious than AIDS. Precedent does not support such an
extensive infringement of women's interests on public health
139
grounds where the risk of transmission is so limited."'
8.

3

State Parens Patriae Power

Id. at 31.

See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Controlling the Resurgent Tuberculosis
Epidemic:A 50-State Survey of TuberculosisStatutes and Proposalsfor Reform,
269 JAMA 255 (1993).
135 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
136 See id.
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On occasion, the state may even intervene into the
constitutionally protected rights of parents to bring up their
children in the name of public health. 140 For example, in Prince v.
Massachusetts,14 1 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the state
to invoke its parens patriae power. 142 In Prince, the Court held
that a State has the power to intervene in family affairs to protect
the welfare of the children, even if doing so infringes on the
parent's right to practice their religion freely. 143 Finding that a
parent's interest in keeping a young child out on the street
distributing religious literature threatened the health and well-being
of the child, the Court found: "The right of parents to rear their
children in accordance with their personal and religious beliefs
gives way when the health or safety of children is threatened or
when parental conduct poses some substantial threat to public
safety."'144 Thus, under its parens patriae power, a state could
attempt to override a pregnant woman's decision to refuse AZT
treatment since such treatment could potentially save the life of her
fetus. However, although state courts have relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Prince to override a parent's refusal to consent
to medical treatment, 145 one commentator noted,
It would be difficult for a court to conclude that the child's
best interest is clearly served by treatment 'with AZT
therapy as opposed to non-treatment. Because the risk of
IV infection to the child, absent antiviral treatment is
approximately one in four, a decision by a mother to 'play
the odds' cannot clearly
be characterized as not in the
46
interest.1
best
child's

140
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In addition, the courts are in conflict as to whether the state
can override a parent's refusal to consent to medical treatment for a
child when the danger to the child's health is not imminent or the
47
proposed treatment is not likely to cure the underlying condition.1
For example, in In re Green,148 where a mother refused to permit
blood transfusions for her son during an operation to correct a
spinal deformity, which may have shortened his life span, the court
declined to override the mother's withholding of consent. 149 in
contrast, in In re Cabrera,the court permitted the override of a
parental refusal to provide consent to blood transfusions where,
without such treatment, the illness had a 16-18% chance of causing
death within a year and a 70% likelihood of severely disabling the
child. 150
While disagreement among the courts over when a state can
override a parent's refusal to consent to medical treatment for a
child makes it difficult to predict how a court would rule on an
HIV-positive pregnant woman's refusal to undergo AZT treatment,
one commentator noted, "[A]ZT's being unnecessary to prevent
HIV transmission in 75% of cases means that the danger to the
fetus is less imminent than required by the standards that the In re
Green and In re Cabreracourts established."' 51 Moreover, there is
a serious flaw with the argument that a state may rely upon its
parens patriae power to override an HIV-positive pregnant
woman's decision to forego medical treatment. The cited parens
patriae cases, which deal with a child, and a mandatory treatment
regime for pregnant women, which deals with a fetus, are
distinguishable scenarios. "The rationale for the doctrine--that the
state interest in protecting a child's life may outweigh, in
extraordinary circumstances, the parent's right to withhold consent
for medical treatment of that child--may not be mechanically
152
asserted to justify an override in the context of pregnancy."'
147
148

See In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972).
See id.

149 See id.; compare id., with In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989).
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Generally, a fetus has no rights under our current legal system until
it is born alive. 153 Moreover, it is impossible to separate the right
to withhold consent to the treatment of the fetus from the right of
the pregnant woman to withhold treatment for herself. And, given
the invasiveness and the potential dangers of AZT treatment to
both mothers and infants, it is unlikely that a mandated AZT
treatment regime could be justified using the parens patriae
doctrine.
9.

State Court Cases

Studies have shown that physicians have been willing to
seek court orders compelling pregnant women to undergo
treatment for the sake of their fetuses. 1 54 Generally, when courts
consider the forced medical treatment of pregnant women, the
degree of intrusiveness of the procedure is evaluated and weighed
with the state's interest in healthy babies. 155 State courts have
intervened on behalf of a fetus to compel Women to undergo blood
transfusions, 156 take medications such as insulin, 157 and submit to
cesarean sections. 158 Generally, the less intrusive the procedure,
the more likely the state will prevail. 159 Courts have commonly
considered forced blood transfusions to be small enough invasions

153
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on pregnant women to justify their use. 16 For example, in InRe
6 ' the court found that the state interest in
Jamaica Hospital,1
protecting the life of the fetus warranted a forced blood transfusion
that was necessary to stabilize a woman in her eighteenth week of
pregnancy and save the life of her unborn child. 162 To date, there
have been only three appellate court decisions involving forced
cesarean sections upon non-consenting pregnant women, and one
involving a forced blood transfusion. 163 For example, in In re
A.C., 164 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided the
legality of a lower court's order that a terminally ill woman who
was unable to state her wishes clearly must undergo a cesarean
section to save her fetus. 165 Finding that in virtually all instances a
woman's right to refuse invasive medical treatment outweighs the
state's interest in the fetus, the lower court's decision was
subsequently vacated upon a showing that neither the woman's
rights nor her decisional competence had been correctly evaluated
because she had been so heavily medicated. 166 Similarly, in In re
Baby Boy Doe,167 the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with the
reasoning in In re A.C. when it held that "a woman's competent
choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section
during pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where
the choice may be harmful to the fetus."' 168 However, in Jefferson
v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 6 9 the court ordered a
woman in her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy to undergo a cesarean
section where it was necessary to save the life of the fetus and the
doctors believed that the mother would have an almost 100%
160
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chance of surviving the procedure. 170 However, even though there
was a competent refusal of consent, the Jefferson ruling can be
distinguished from In re A.C. and In re Baby Boy Doe because the
evidence in Jefferson showed that performance of the cesarean
section was clearly in the medical interests of both the mother and
the fetus.
In light of these state court cases, a court could conceivably
find forced AZT treatment acceptable since it only involves
swallowing a pill five times a day and is therefore fairly
noninvasive.171
However, since AZT has both known and
unknown significant side effects, 172 there may be powerful medical
reasons for a pregnant woman to decline such treatment.
Therefore, by allowing a state to mandate AZT treatment for
pregnant women, the rights and health of the mother may be
compromised in favor of the health of the fetus. Particularly
because AZT treatment could seriously endanger the mother's
health, 173 mandated treatment regimes would likely be found
unjustified. Moreover, "The indications that AZT use may cause
harm to otherwise healthy infants and may precipitate severe
illness and death more rapidly in HIV-positive infants make it clear
that the potential benefits of AZT come with a high cost to some
fetuses, even if it prevents HIV infection in others."' 174 Thus, it is
not even certain that the unborn child will safely benefit from AZT
treatment in the long run.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this paper illustrates, mandatory AZT treatment of HIVpositive pregnant women raises a host of legal, political, medical,
and public health policy issues. State implementation of such a
regime would have severe detrimental effects on the rights of
women. Such a policy would in effect place greater weight on the
interests of the state and the fetus than the pregnant woman and
170
171
172
173
174
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would create a legal atmosphere that could lead to further
restrictions on women's rights. Further, such a coercive treatment
regime could fail to encourage a cooperative relationship between
physicians and their patients and would likely lead to an
environment of distrust between the pregnant woman and her
doctor. This could be particularly damaging because most women
who are infected with HIV already lack access to care. 175 As a
result, there would likely be a "chilling" effect on pregnant women
seeking health care. Finally, a mandatory AZT treatment regime
runs afoul of basic constitutional protections including the right to
privacy, equal protection, and the right to informed consent. Thus,
instead of considering a mandatory approach to heath care, states
should consider offering voluntary, comprehensive, and
confidential health care support services for HIV-positive pregnant
women. For example, at Harlem Hospital in New York City, more
than 90% of pregnant women and postpartum mothers consented to
testing where HIV related counseling was offered universally, was
voluntary and confidential, and was linked to available care and
services. 176 Therefore, if a flexible and comprehensive public
health approach to the problem of pediatric AIDS existed, our
society might truly be able to assist those who are plagued with
such a devastating disease.
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See discussion infra Part II.
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